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Introduction
The East Asian crisis was remarkable for its rapid spread, its severity, and for generally catching unaware international investors, governments, and societies at large. It has severely tested the existing surveillance mechanisms in Southeast Asia and found them wanting. Thus, one of the key policy initiatives agreed upon by authorities in Southeast Asia, in the soul searching that inevitably followed the onset of the crisis, was to call for enhanced surveillance for the region 1 . More concretely, the ASEAN Surveillance Process was formally established in late 1997 as a collective response to the financial crisis.
The ASEAN surveillance and monitoring mechanism occupies pride of place as the primary regional institution to oversee the task of crisis prevention. By institutionalizing the process of consultation and early warning to spot impending shocks, it is hoped that future crisis could either be averted, or that its costs are mitigated if ever one occurs. For these reasons, the initiative has received endorsement at the highest political levels in the ASEAN. This paper reviews the case for surveillance and monitoring in Southeast Asia, highlights the merits and limitations of the ASEAN Surveillance and Monitoring mechanism, and suggests ways for the surveillance mechanism to proceed in the context of the lessons learned from the regional financial crisis of 1997.
The Case for a Regional Surveillance and Monitoring Mechanism
1 In November 1997, deputies from 14 economies from the Asia-Pacific (including Japan, the USA and Australia) got together in Manila to craft a four-point regional response to the crisis. The outcome of the meeting, referred to as the Manila Framework, were: a) mechanism for regional surveillance to complement the global surveillance of the IMF, b) enhanced economic and technical cooperation in strengthening domestic financial systems, c) measures to strengthen the IMF's capacity to respond to financial crisis and d) a cooperative financing agreement that would supplement IMF resources (Chang and Rajan, 2001) .
A standard argument for international economic cooperation, is that international financial and economic stability is a public good 2 . All countries benefit from a stable financial environment regardless of whether they contributed to it. But it also means that a country can easily disregard the potential negative spillover effects it can create, if it adopts unsustainable policies in pursuit of certain national objectives. As Crockett (1987) Clearly the recent crisis served as a wake-up call to many Asian economies.
After growing briskly in the 1990s, the ASEAN as a whole, together with South Korea, suffered steep declines in output in 1998. The contrast is striking in the light of the congratulatory atmosphere with which ASEAN, after recording one of the most impressive growth rates as a region, celebrated its 30 th anniversary in 1997. The
Asian crisis has brought home the realization that a changed world environment, or more generally, economic globalization, has raised the stakes of policy failures Rodrik, 2000) .
While actions to forestall a crisis have largely to be undertaken at the national level, there remains a pressing need to explore regional solutions given the dynamics of open markets and systems which link the economies closer with each other. The establishment of a regional surveillance process for the ASEAN is one such initiative.
The ASEAN Surveillance Mechanism
The capabilities of the different national authorities. This mechanism also provides the setting where ASEAN as a group can decide on certain collective actions.
In keeping with the "ASEAN way", the surveillance process will be undertaken on the basis of consensus and informality. Unlike more formal processes, such as the EU, the leverage of the ASEAN surveillance in eliciting the appropriate behavior or policy of members is "peer pressure". While this may seem to depart from the policy of noninterference in domestic affairs, ASEAN policymakers have increasingly come to grips with the necessity of constructive engagement, especially in financial matters where the contagion effects threaten (UN ESCAP, 2000).
The ASEAN Surveillance Coordinating Unit provides the policy support for the process. The focus of the discussions is a draft surveillance report, produced by the aforementioned unit, which incorporates the economic and financial data of members, other topics relevant to the stability of the region, and inputs from institutions undertaking regular surveillance activities. The IMF lends institutional support to this process by providing the global macroeconomic outlook. After passing through the level of ASEAN Finance and Central Bank Deputies Meeting, the draft is finalized and passed onto the ASEAN Finance Ministers. The end product of the peer review process could be regional or national measures that would find expression in a joint ministerial statement. Thus, the consultations at this point are confined to the ASEAN representatives.
Value-added in the ASEAN Surveillance Process
How meaningful then is an ASEAN surveillance process? How will it add value to the existing surveillance mechanisms in Asia? Of course, in the absence of a track record, evaluating a nascent initiative is not easy. However, the fact that the crisis did take place and that it was largely unanticipated, indicate that there are certain gaps in existing surveillance on the global and national levels. The usefulness of the proposed regional mechanism should be evaluated according to the extent to which it could address the gaps in existing mechanisms prior to the crisis.
What are the gaps in existing surveillance mechanisms and could the ASEAN surveillance process potentially address these?
First, surveillance can fail because countries do not disclose adequate and timely information. Information about existing conditions, decisions, and actions should be made accessible, visible and understandable to all. In an early warning system, the provision of timely and accurate information is critical in providing lead times for policy responses to matter. Accuracy, on the other hand, is important for formulating the appropriate policy response. Unless these information problems are addressed, surveillance and early warning systems will be severely hampered.
Of course, transparency for its own sake is desirable because it helps instill market discipline. In a world of global capital flows, crises can arise from information surprises that cause the market participants to make sharp changes in their expectations. In the context of the Asian crisis, improved transparency might have helped prevent the build-up of huge maturity and currency mismatches in the financial and corporate sectors, prompted swifter policy response, and limited contagion. If markets had access to accurate and timely information, they can more gradually adjust their investment decisions according to financial and economic conditions of emerging markets, thus avoiding panics and "creditor-grab" behavior.
As Nord (2000) points out, transparency promotes public understanding of and debate on economic policy, and makes policymakers more accountable for their actions. Along this line, the moral hazard problems in crony capitalism, where cozy relationships between banks and corporations can lead to overlending and investments in excessively risky areas, can be addressed more satisfactorily when information about the state of exposure of banks and other financial firms is known in advance.
Moreover, transparency allows the markets to differentiate between countries, thus helping them to function better. In periods of financial stress, a lack of transparency tends to reinforce rather than dispel the uncertainty. As such, through contagion, countries that have good underlying fundamentals can be adversely affected. For instance, during the advent of a crisis, it is usually not easy to gather good information such as the level of nonperforming loans (NPLs) and other vulnerability indicators. Hence, the task of identifying the robust economies from the affected ones in one region becomes quite difficult. As a consequence, the failure of one emerging market can be taken by creditors as a signal to reevaluate the creditworthiness of the other similar markets in the region.
In sum, the provision of timely information can help mitigate the specter of contagion effects and stabilize expectations and market sentiments. As Rajan (2000) has emphasized, for the ASEAN process to function well, the provision of timely, reliable, accurate and comparable macroeconomic and financial data is paramount.
Unless the authorities are more forthcoming with providing information, there is the risk that policy dialogues will be vague and, as a consequence, would not be persuasive enough to influence country behavior. The value-added of the ASEAN surveillance process would have to be evaluated on the basis to which it is able to promote transparency or flow of information among ASEAN members. Clearly, the preparation of the draft surveillance report on the ASEAN members would require updated macroeconomic and financial data. In fact, while the full template of the data required of each member economy is still under discussion in the ASEAN case, it is likely that standard macroeconomic performance and financial indicators will be collected on a regular basis. This at least is a promising start.
Second, even though an early warning system can in fact elicit a timely warning or signal, surveillance may still fail because political considerations prevent the appropriate policy response from being exercised. In fact, it has been reported that the IMF had already foreseen the collapse of the Thai baht peg prior to its July 1997 crash but the appropriate policy response to adjust the exchange rate was not forthcoming due to political reasons (Crow et al., 1999) . The Asian experience illustrates that, even though policymakers may know what needs to be done, they may not do it because it is costly or they lack the political will. The danger of course, is that this may lead to policy inertia until it is too late for policy responses to matter.
As mentioned earlier, peer pressure is the leverage by which the ASEAN surveillance process aims to solicit appropriate policy changes among the members 7 .
In order to help members internalize the spillover effects of their individual policies over the region, there should be a frank exchange of views. However, there are certain concerns raised about how the realpolitik of ASEAN, particularly, its noninterventionist policy, could constrain the effectiveness of the regional surveillance process. In particular, has emphasized that apart from substantial differences in size and levels of economic development, the noninterventionist policy in ASEAN may prevent the expressions of criticisms directed toward a particular country's unsustainable (and probably misguided) policies.
Indeed, ASEAN was criticized for not taking substantial action to address the recent crisis or not acting sooner. As a consequence, there are proposals to allow the members to speak frankly and openly about their views on the developments in the other members in the spirit of 'constructive intervention and flexible engagement' (Collantes, 1999) .
In addition, to motivate the policymakers to adopt the required policy response in the face of a looming crisis, taking into consideration the political cost of doing so, there should be "ownership" of the process. Weak ownership of the process can compromise the quality of cooperation of the parties concerned. This has repercussions on the timely and accurate provision of data as well on the willingness of the policymakers to engage in a frank exchange of views. For this reason, the surveillance process is managed and run by ASEAN, and not by the IMF or the ADB. Furthermore, by limiting the mechanism to the ASEAN members, the process carries less risk of having the decisions held captive by the views and individual agendas of the dominant economies.
The third gap is more technical in nature. It is possible that the models used in the existing surveillance mechanisms were unsuitable in view of the nature of the Asian crisis. Because of these technical limitations, the conditions in Asia prior to the crisis were not diagnosed correctly and important points of vulnerability were not picked up. Consider the IMF's system of global surveillance. One criticism directed at the IMF bilateral surveillance is that it did not focus enough on the state of the financial sector, which has been the weak spot of the affected countries. Rather, the IMF bilateral surveillance concentrated on macroeconomic issues instead of those that deal with volatility of capital inflows, consequences of financial liberalization, maturity mismatches, and asset bubbles which are more directly related to the particular nature of the recent crisis in East Asia and elsewhere.
An analysis of this gap in surveillance raises a more fundamental point: Are crises predictable? Predictability depends on the nature of the crisis. If the currency crisis, for example, is induced by inconsistent macroeconomic policies similar to the Krugman (1979) model, then it can be predictable. However, when the crisis is due to financial panic (Radelet and Sachs, 1998) . Berg and Patillo (1998) tested the out-of-sample performance of different models of early warning systems in predicting crises and found the forecasting ability of the existing models rather poor 9 .
Apart from conceptual difficulties, there are some practical problems associated with early warning systems. For one, there are doubts on whether indicators of crises are alike for all countries. For another, there is the problem of endogeneity of policy (Berg and Patillo, 1998) in that policymakers may respond to a signal of an impending crisis and actually avert a crisis. However, in so doing, the early warning that was raised becomes a false alarm as no crisis materialized, and the track record of the early warning system in predicting a crisis may be perversely sullied. Furthermore, constructing an early warning based on historical data to warn of a crisis that has its origins in something new may be problematic. To illustrate, the Asian crisis is different from the imbalances in the current account but rather stem from the capital account and therefore calls for quite different crisis prevention and management strategies However, due to build-up of vulnerabilities over the years, their financial systems could not handle the sudden capital reversals and consequent curtailment of credit that took place. In contrast, though not insulated from the regional turmoil, Singapore's robust financial sector absorbed the shocks with less damage than the most affected economies (Manzano and Moreno, 1998) .
One explanation of the cause of the crisis is that it stems from policies that encouraged imprudent lending or excessive risk-taking, making the economies vulnerable to shocks. Since many economies in East Asia liberalized their financial systems without putting in place the appropriate regulatory institutions, systematically risky banking practices and mismanagement persisted. The consequences were dubious investments, maturity mismatches in the balance sheet of banks, and the like. However, rapid economic growth rates masked the weaknesses of the financial systems.
The ASEAN surveillance process could potentially address this gap by instituting a system to facilitate the information flow for its members. Recall that the build-up of vulnerabilities in the financial system could remain undetected due to the lack of timely and accurate information. Transparency can reduce uncertainty and allows the markets to assess risks more accurately. Furthermore, because transparency promotes accountability of policymakers, they are encouraged (or subjected to pressure) to make earlier and more fundamental policy adjustments (Nord, 2000) .
Final Remarks
Regional surveillance mechanisms are meant to complement and not supplant the global surveillance function of the IMF or the national surveillance activities of central banks. While more international cooperation is preferable to less, a valid question is whether resources allocated to setting up the ASEAN surveillance process is justified. While a strict benefit-cost analysis is obviously not possible, an analytical justification of the usefulness of this mechanism can be made on the basis of the extent to which this mechanism could potentially fill in the gaps of existing surveillance in Asia.
A review of the gaps in Southeast Asia reveals that surveillance was not able to prevent the crisis owing to lack of transparency, the presence of political obstacles to policy adjustments, deficiencies in the surveillance models used, and the pervasive extent of vulnerabilities. To the extent that the proposed surveillance mechanism can: (a) promote more transparency, (b) allow policymakers to internalize ADB, likewise, prepares a regional surveillance report twice a year which is to be used as a background document for the Manila Framework meetings.
the spillover effects of their policies on other countries; (c) promote the ownership of individual country reforms to improve the robustness of economic and financial systems; (d) enhance the quality of policy analysis and support by tapping into the resources of IMF, ADB, BIS, and other specialized agencies; and (e) give feedback with regard to the extent of vulnerabilities of the financial systems, then the initiative is properly placed to add value to the existing surveillance processes in East Asia.
These would constitute the concrete challenges of the ASEAN initiative on regional surveillance.
The philosophical foundation for engaging in a regional effort is the principle of subsidiarity. In crisis prevention, for instance, this takes the form of deploying, at the regional level, the measures and instruments which are being advocated for surveillance at the global level. Subsidiarity, which calls for devolving responsibility for dealing with an issue to the lowest level of governance capable of handling it, implies that measures might be better implemented through stronger regional institutions or mechanisms in which many member countries can participate more meaningfully than they can in global or multilateral arrangements (Mistry, 1999) . A regional mechanism could be a more "natural" disciplinarian as the countries that make up the region would have the greatest stake in maintaining economic and financial stability, and would presumably have the greatest incentive of internalizing the effects of "irresponsible" policies.
In the end, the merits of the ASEAN surveillance ought to be judged on the basis of whether it improves the ability of policymakers to identify policies that will make their economies more resilient to shocks and suggest ways to respond to shocks in an appropriate and timely fashion.
